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Raymond Williams is one of the most important and influential cultural theorists. 
Although he wrote on communication(s), the main reception of his works is today 
predominantly focused on his works on literature and culture. This article therefore 
presents an overview of his notion of communication and asks: How does Raymond 
Williams conceive of communication? How can we use his communicative 
materialism today for understanding digital communication? Williams advanced a 
materialist understanding of communication. His elements of a materialist 
communication theory help us to illuminate communication in the context of the 
base/superstructure problem, and ideology as a peculiar form of instrumental 
communication. He provides concepts that we need for a materialist understanding 
of digital media. The article concludes that we need the approach of communicative 
materialism for grounding a Marxist theory of communication that is relevant to the 
analysis of digital media. 
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Raymond Williams (1921–1988) is today primarily remembered as a cultural and 
literary theorist and as a novelist. But to what extent was he also a communication 
theorist and to what extent can we use his approach for understanding digital 
communication? This article tries to answer these questions. Digital media analysis, 
in general, lacks theoretical foundations. Williams’ approach can be used for 
mitigating this circumstance and for renewing cultural studies’ engagement with 
Marxian theory. 
Jim McGuigan (2014: xv) reminds us that ‘Williams’s project was much broader 
than that of a literary scholar’, and that Williams was an influential social theorist. In 
his often-overlooked book Communications, Williams (1976: 9) asks, ‘What do we 
mean by communication?’ He then draws a distinction between communications as 
systems and means of information communication and communication as human 
social process.1 Given that Williams asks what we mean by communication, it is 
worthwhile asking if there are elements of a theory of communication in his works. 
This essay discusses the materiality of communication, the base/superstructure 
problem and the notion of ideology in Williams’ work. It shows that these dimensions 
are important for his materialist understanding of communication, and that each of 
them helps us to critically understand digital media. 
 
The materialist theory of communication 
 
Culture and communication are closely connected. Williams (2005: 243) argues that 
his approach of cultural materialism stresses ‘the centrality of language and 
communication as formative social forces’. It is well known that Raymond Williams 
understood culture as a whole way of life. Culture includes lived culture, recorded 
culture and traditional culture (Williams, 1961 [2011]: 70). All three require 
‘characteristic forms through which members of the society communicate’ (p. 62). 
The creation of culture requires ‘communication and the making of institutions’ (p. 
126). For Williams (1981a: 13), culture is a signifying system, consisting of practices 
through which ‘a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and 
explored’ (Williams, 1981a: 13). This means that wherever there is culture, there is 
communication. When we communicate, we constitute culture. We need a theory of 
communication in order to have some idea of how communication relates to 
community, how it relates to society, what kind of communication systems we now 
have, what they tell us about our society, and what we can see as reasonable 
directors for the future. And we can only do this by theory. (Williams, 1989b: 20) 
Rejecting both purely subjectivist and objectivist approaches, Williams 
(1976) distinguishes between communication and communications. Communication 
is the ‘passing of ideas, information, and attitudes from person to person’, and 
communications are ‘the institutions and forms in which ideas, information, and 
attitudes are transmitted and received’ (Williams, 1976: 9). Whereas communication 
is a human social process and a practice (Williams, 2014: 175), communications are 
systems, institutions and forms. There is a dialectic of communication and 
communications: Humans communicate by means of communication, whereas 
communications are created and re-created by human co-production and 
communication. 
Williams (1976: 130–137) in his book Communications distinguishes between 
authoritarian, paternal, commercial and democratic organisational forms of the media 
(see Sparks, 1993). The first three communications systems are political, cultural 
and commercial expressions of instrumental reason. Authoritarian communications 
involve state control, manipulation and censorship of the media. The ‘purpose of 
communication is to protect, maintain, or advance a social order based on minority 
power’ (p. 131). Paternal communications are authoritarian communications ‘with a 
conscience: that is to say, with values and purposes beyond the maintenance of its 
own power’ (p. 131). In such communication systems, there is ideological control that 
aims to impose certain moral values on audiences. The controllers of paternal 
communication systems assume that specific morals are good for citizens, and that 
the latter are too silly to understand the world. In commercial communications, there 
is commercial control: ‘Anything can be said, provided that you can afford to say it 
and that you can say it profitably’ (p. 133). All three forms have an instrumental 
character: Authoritarian, paternal and commercial communications instrumentalise 
communication and turn it into a tool for control and domination. 
In contrast, democratic communications are for Williams based on cooperative 
rationality. Such media systems are based on the freedom to speak and the free 
choice of what to receive. Such communications are ‘means of participation and of 
common discussion’ (p. 134). Williams (1976, 1983b) argues for a ‘cultural 
democracy’ that combines public-service media, cultural co-operatives and local 
media (see also pp. 65–72). Such a democracy establishes ‘new kinds of communal, 
cooperative and collective institutions’ (Williams, 1983b: 123). The core of Williams’ 
proposal is 
that public ownership of the basic means of production [the means of communication 
and cultural production] should be combined with leasing their use to self-managing 
groups, to secure maximum variety of style and political opinion and to ensure against 
any bureaucratic control. (Williams, 1979: 370) The idea of public service must be 
detached from the idea of public monopoly, yet remain public service in the true sense. 
(Williams, 1976: 134) 
Instrumental and co-operative media are contradictory forces. Practically 
speaking, one can assess the instrumental and co-operative character of a medium 
by asking to which degree it is based on collective control and advances critique and 
reflection. Only cultural forms of class struggle can drive back the capitalist 
colonisation of communications. Democratic communications are the dominant form 
of communication in a socialist society, in which ‘the basic cultural skills are made 
widely available, and the channels of communication widened and cleared, as much 
as possible’ (Williams, 1958 [1983]: 283). 
Williams was a thorough reader and interpreter of Marx. He found particular 
interest in Marx’s quest for an alternative to capitalism. Marx is a constant point of 
reference throughout Williams’ oeuvre. Frequently being asked, ‘You’re a Marxist, 
Aren’t You?’ (Williams, 1989b: 65–76), Williams rejected the derogatory implications 
the question often had and criticised the lack of engagement that it brought along. 
He writes about how orthodox Marxists often declared that a specific position ‘has 
nothing in common with Marxism’ and how every socialist theorist was flatly ‘referred 
to as a Communist whether or not one actually carried the party card of membership 
in the Communist Party’ (Williams, 1989b: 65). Williams rejected both Stalinist 
orthodoxy and anti-Marxism, but made clear that for him Marx ‘was the greatest 
thinker in the socialist tradition’ (p. 66). He argued that his approach of Marxism was 
one that stressed ‘the connections between a political and economic formation, a 
cultural and educational formation, and, […] the formations of feeling and 
relationship which are our immediate resources in any struggle’ (p. 76). 
Contemporary Marxism that focuses on ‘the real meanings of totality’, the 
questioning of capitalism and domination as totalities, would be ‘a movement to 
which I find myself belonging and to which I am glad to belong’ (p. 76). Given that 
such an understanding guided Williams’ works, it is no surprise that he, as we will 
see next, also related the concept of communication to Marx’s theory. 
Williams (2005) argues that the political transformation of society has to include 
communications, and that socialism entails, as Marx says, ‘“the production of the 
very form of communication”, in which, with the ending of the division of labour within 
the mode of production itself, individuals would speak “as individuals,” as integral 
human beings’ (p. 57). Williams, here, refers to Marx’s Feuerbach chapter in 
the German Ideology, where Marx writes in a note that conditions of human self-
activity mean ‘Production der Verkehrsform selbst’ (Marx and Engels, 1845a: 72) – 
‘Production of the form of intercourse itself’ (p. 91). In the German Ideology, Marx 
uses the term Verkehrsform for what he later termed the relations of production 
(Produktionsverhältnisse). He later spoke of Verkehr as ‘Kommunikations- und 
Transportmittel’ (Marx, 1867a, 1867b: 405) [‘means of communication and transport’, 
(p. 506) and continued to use the term ‘Produktions- und Verkehrsverhältnisse’ 
(Marx and Engels 1845b, 91). [‘relations of production and forms of intercourse’, (p. 
90). So Marx used the term ‘forms of intercourse’ and not, as Williams translates the 
term, the ‘very form of communication’. 
Marx situates the notion of Transportmittel at the level of the productive forces 
and the concept of Verkehrsverhältnisse at the level of the relations of 
production. Transport means the shifting of an object in space from position A to 
position B. Verkehr is more general and has three meanings: (a) transport, (b) 
contact/relation and (c) sexual intercourse. Marx speaks of the means of 
communication as part of the productive forces but uses the term Verkehr in a 
general sense as social relations in the sense of (b). So when Williams says that, for 
Marx, socialism means that humans produce and control the form of communication, 
the imprecise translation also contains two truths: 
1. Socialism is a fundamental change of the productive forces, which includes 
changes of the means of communication; 
2. Socialism changes the relations of production, that is, the social relations that 
are established and maintained in and through communication. 
Williams’ quest for an alternative society and alternative communications remains 
of key importance in the age of digital media: In the digital media world, what 
Williams in Communications terms commercial communications is dominant. This 
becomes evident when one, for example, thinks of monopoly capitalist firms such as 
Google (search engines), Facebook (social networks), Microsoft (operating systems) 
and Amazon (online shopping). Also, authoritarian communications is present on the 
Internet, which becomes evident when we think of Edward Snowden’s revelations 
about online surveillance, the Chinese Internet and the way right-wing authoritarians 
such as Donald Trump use social media (Fuchs, 2017b, 2017a). The alternative type 
of communications that Williams described as having democratic potential exists on 
the Internet but is relatively marginal. Two well-known examples are Wikipedia and 
non-profit, radical open access journals and books. 
The instrumental logic of society and the Internet that manifests itself as the 
exploitation of digital labour, domination online, and ideologies of and on the Internet 
is never perfect, but always prone to attack by social struggles. Such struggles are 
not an automatic reaction to domination, but are always a possibility. Raymond 
Williams’ stress on alternative communications reminds us that the dominant, 
instrumental Internet is not an inevitable end point: that a commons-based Internet 
and a public-service Internet are feasible alternatives that are possible but are at the 
moment marginal. Williams also understood that political action is needed. He, for 
example, argued for ‘selective and variable levels of taxation’ (Williams, 1976: 164) 
and for taxing advertising. Today, online giants such as Google make use of tax 
avoidance strategies in order to maximise their profits and defend their monopolies. 
An online advertising tax could be a strategy aimed at forcing the online giants to pay 
taxes. Taxing large corporations’ profits could fund a participatory media fee: In this 
model, the state collects corporate taxes and re-distributes a part of it to citizens via 
participatory budgeting to citizens, who receive annual media cheques that they are 
obliged to donate to non-profit Internet and media projects. Public-service media 
could create and operate an alternative, advertising-free YouTube that makes their 
programme archives available for remixing and re-use. 
Williams (1977) advanced the approach of cultural materialism, especially in the 
book Marxism and Literature (Williams, 1977). Cultural materialism has an ‘emphasis 
on production’ (Williams, 1981b: 12) and is the ‘analysis of all forms of signification 
[…] within the actual means and conditions of their production’ (Williams, 1983a: 
210). Williams (1983b) argues that communication is not secondary to the forces and 
relations of production because ‘relations between people in the society are often 
seen most easily by looking at the institutions of communication’ (p. 22) and because 
‘it is through communication systems that the reality of ourselves, the reality of our 
society, forms and is interpreted’ (p. 23). Seeing communication as material allows 
us to stress that the production of social relations through communication is a key 
feature of society. 
Williams rejects the orthodox Marxist assumption that language is a reflection of 
material reality that lies outside of it and was created after human labour came into 
existence. In Marxism and Literature, Williams (1977) stresses that it is important to 
see that language is an activity (p. 20). It is material because in it, the ‘physical body’ 
produces ‘agitated layers of air, sounds’ (p. 29). It is a social relationship (p. 30). 
‘Language is in fact a special kind of material practice: that of human sociality’ (p. 
165). For Williams, spoken words are material because they make use of immediate 
human resources, whereas written words would be material because they make use 
of non-human resources (p. 169). Language and communication are part of that 
material reality, not external to it. He stresses the important influence of Valentin 
Vološinov’s (1986 [1929]) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language on the 
development of a materialist theory of language. Vološinov against reflection theory 
recovered ‘the full emphasis on language as activity, as practical consciousness’ (p. 
35). ‘Signification, the social creation of meanings through the use of formal signs, is 
then a practical material activity; it is indeed, literally, a means of production’ (p. 38). 
Given that all communication offers meanings of the world to others, we can also 
say that all social relations inherently involve communication. Communication is the 
process in which humans produce meaning and thereby constitute culture. Whereas 
communication is the social production of meanings, culture is the system in which 
communication takes place. Culture is the totality of social meanings and meaning-
making practices that shapes, conditions, enables and constrains our everyday 
communication that reproduces the cultural system and its structures. Economic, 
political and other social systems all have their ‘own signifying system – for they are 
always relations between conscious and communicating human beings’ (Williams, 
1981a: 207). And they are ‘necessarily elements of a wider and more general 
signifying system’ (p. 207). This means that culture is ‘a system in itself’ (p. 208). It 
operates intrinsic to all social systems. Culture and social systems are ‘mutually 
constitutive’ (p. 217). 
In his 1978 essay Means of Communication as Means of Production, Williams 
(2005: 50–63) stresses that culture and communication are not simply ideas but also 
material because they require means of communication: 
[M]eans of communication, from the simplest physical forms of language to the most 
advanced forms of communications technology, are themselves always socially and 
materially produced, and of course reproduced. Yet they are not only forms but means 
of production, since communication and its material means are intrinsic to all 
distinctively human forms of labour and social organization, thus constituting 
indispensable elements both of the productive forces and the social relations of 
production. (p. 50) 
The means of communication are ‘intrinsic, related and determined parts of the 
whole historical social and material process’ (p. 52). Orthodox Marxist approaches 
exclude communications from the means of production. They associate the means of 
production with ‘mechanical formulations of base and superstructure’, in which 
communication is seen as ‘a second-order or second-stage process, entered into 
only after the decisive productive and social-material relationships have been 
established’ (p. 53). One of the reasons why such a position is untenable is that 
communications have become important industries and play an important general 
role in the economy (p. 53). Means of communication have a history that is part of, 
but not reducible to, the history of the general means of production, to which it 
stands in a variable relation (Table 1). 
  
Table 1. 
William’s typology of the means of communication (based on Williams, 2005: 53–
63; 1981a, chapter 4). 
Communication based on 








Body language: dance, postures, 
gestures, facial expressions, 
Communications based on 
non-human materials 




Megaphone, television, radio, cable 




Seals, coins, medals, paintings, 
sculptures, carvings, woodcuts, 
written texts, printed texts, sound 




Alternative speaking, listening, 
seeing, recording featuring 
democratic communal use, self-
management, autonomy, collective 
cultural production: e.g. community 
radio 
 
Williams established a typology of the means of communication (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The relation of the economic and the non-economic in society. 
 
Digital media result in a convergence of these types of means of communication: 
The Internet is a convergent information, communication and co-operation 
technology, on which the various types of means of communication that Williams 
identifies converge. In the online realm, we can find verbal communication in the 
form of written text (e.g. chat rooms) or spoken text (e.g. Skype), non-verbal 
communication (images, memes, digital music, etc.), the amplification of reception 
(e.g. BBC iPlayer and file sharing), storage (e.g. Dropbox and iCloud) and alternative 
(non-profit and non-instrumental) communications (e.g. Wikipedia and Democracy 
Now!). 
Williams argues that historically amplificatory and durative communications have 
come under the dominant class’ control. In capitalism, this has resulted in 
concentrated and monopolised communications industries that in new ways make 
voice, visibility and access selective and a realm of asymmetric power. The basic 
problem is the expropriation and commodification of the means of communication 
(Williams, 1989b: 26; Williams, 2005: 62). 
The discussion shows that Williams takes a materialist approach for 
understanding communication, and that there is an implicit theory of communication 
in Williams’ works that can be re-constructed. Given that Williams foregrounds the 
material character of communication, we can characterise his approach not just as 
cultural materialism but also as communicative materialism. Speaking of 
communicative materialism implies that one has to re-visit the problem of base and 
superstructure. 
 
Communicative materialism and the ‘base’/’superstructure’-problem 
 
In Marxist theory, culture, ideas, communication, information, knowledge, morals and 
ideologies are often described as belonging to an immaterial superstructure that is 
spatially built on a material, economic base and came temporally into existence after 
that base. The base/superstructure problem asks the question of how the economic 
and the non-economic are related to each other. The strength of Marxist theory is 
that it has the potential to make us aware of the fact that when we talk about politics 
and culture, we need to also think of the economy and the other way around. 
In Marxism and Literature, Williams (1977) reviews solutions to the 
base/superstructure problem in Marxist theory. He argues that the term 
superstructure tends to be associated with institutions, forms of consciousness, 
political and cultural practices (p. 77). He challenges seeing culture as ‘dependent, 
secondary, “superstructural”: a realm of “mere” ideas, beliefs, arts, customs, 
determined by the basic material history’ (p. 19). It is idealist to separate ‘“culture” 
from material social life’ (p. 19). In such a separation, ‘intellectual and cultural 
production […] appear to be “immaterial”’ (Williams, 1989c: 205). According 
to Williams (1977), many Marxist approaches separate base (the mode of 
production) and superstructure either temporally (‘first material production, then 
consciousness, then politics and culture’) or spatially (various levels and layers all 
built on the layer of the economic base; p. 78). Such approaches forget that Marx 
in the German Ideology argues ‘against the separation of “areas” of thought and 
activity (as in the separation of consciousness from material production)’ (p. 78). 
One has to see the ‘direct material production of “politics”’ and ‘the material 
character of the production of a cultural order’ (p. 93) in order to critically understand 
society today as much as in Williams’ days: 
The social and political order which maintains a capitalist market, like the social and 
political struggles which created it, is necessarily a material production. From castles 
and palaces and churches to prisons and workhouses and schools; from weapons of 
war to a controlled press: any ruling class, in variable ways though always materially, 
produces a social and political order. These are never superstructural activities. They 
are the necessary material production within which an apparently self-subsistent mode 
of production can alone be carried on. (p. 93) 
The categories used in Marxist theory for describing the relationship of base and 
superstructure include determination, reflection, mediation, typification 
(representation and illustration), homology and correspondence. All these notions 
leave culture and the economy separate and are not ‘materialist enough’ (p. 92, 97). 
So Williams’ criticism is that Marxist theory has too often assumed a dualism of 
culture and the economy, as, for example, in Habermas’ theory of communication 
(Fuchs, 2016a). Through Williams’ we are able to re-consider Marx and establish a 
materialist and truly dialectical theory of communication. 
In Marxism and Literature, it also becomes evident that Williams in 1977 had 
changed his position on how to think of the base/superstructure problem in 
comparison to the 1973 Base and Superstructure article (Williams, 2005: 31–49) and 
to Culture & Society (Williams 1958[1983]). In the two earlier works, he ascertained 
the differentiation between base and superstructure and basically took a position of 
interactive dualist mediation, in which the two realms interact, condition and exert 
pressure on each other, and set each other limits. In Marxism & Literature, he rejects 
the notion of mediation and the strong and soft forms of determination as dualist and 
idealist. He instead argues that cultural materialism holds the position that culture 
and communication are material, and that they are part and not part of the economy 
at the same time. Figure 1 visualises the relationship of the economic and the non-
economic. 
The non-economic includes the political (processes of collective decision-making) 
and the cultural (processes of collective meaning-making). Passing laws in a 
parliament is a form of production. It involves human work of not just politicians but 
also consultants, researchers, party secretaries and officials, administrators, 
archivists, public relations officials, security personnel and so on. A newspaper is a 
cultural artefact. Its production involves journalists, editors, designers, advertising 
experts, web editors, social media experts, printers and so on. Both the law as a 
political artefact and the newspaper as a cultural artefact do not just have this 
economic dimension of production but have effect all over society. They are 
produced and used, economic and non-economic phenomena. We can learn from 
Williams that the materialist concept of social production explodes the 
base/superstructure model that separates the economic and the non-economic and 
interprets the political and the cultural as ‘immaterial’. 
What is the role of communication in the model shown in Figure 1? 
Communication is the social process of symbolic interaction that brings together and 
relates different actors in the production and use of objects (artefacts and specific 
social structures). In the economic production of use values (including political and 
cultural use values), humans communicate in order to co-ordinate the production 
process. In the use and application of these use values in society, they also 
communicate and use means of communicative production in order to make 
meaning of society, which means making meaning of other humans and one’s 
relation to them. 
An example: When one eats a meal prepared in a restaurant, then the process of 
eating is a bodily activity aimed at nourishment. If eating is organised as a dinner, 
then it is also an opportunity for socialising through communication, for example, with 
friends. And what food we choose, where we eat and go out, how we dress and so 
on have also a symbolic dimension that communicates something about our status, 
habitus, cultural distinction, reputation and so on. Food is an object that is co-
produced by nature and humans. Its use produces and reproduces not just the 
human body but also sociality, status, reputation and power. It is thereby 
simultaneously economic, biological, social, cultural and political. Communication is 
the activity that sets food in the example and other entities, in general, as an object 
into the relation between humans. Given that communication is the social production 
of meaning in culture and culture as system is in its process-dimension 
communication, cultural production operates through communication in any social 
system. There is a dialectic of communication and culture. 
For Williams (1977), Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is important for cultural 
materialism. Hegemony is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the 
whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of 
ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive 
and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming. (p. 110) 
Hegemony is culture as ‘lived dominance and subordination of particular classes’ 
(p. 110). Art, ideas, aesthetics and ideology are ‘real practices, elements of whole 
material social process’ (p. 94). Cultural production is ‘social and material’ (p. 138; 
see also Williams, 1989b, 1989c: 206): 
Cultural work and activity are not […] a superstructure: not only because of the depth 
and thoroughness at which any cultural hegemony is lived, but because cultural 
tradition and practice are seen as much more than superstructural expressions – 
reflections, mediations, or typifications – of a formed social and economic structure. 
On the contrary, they are among the basic processes of the formation itself. (p. 111) 
Ideas are ‘elements of a hegemony’, the ‘whole area of lived experience’ (p. 111). 
Although Williams argues that hegemony is ‘continually resisted’ (p. 112), for 
Gramsci the concept predominantly has to do with the reproduction of domination in 
everyday life. Gramsci (1971) argues that there are ‘two major superstructural 
“levels”’ (p. 12): civil society and the state. Civil society is the realm of hegemony that 
‘the dominant group exercises throughout society’, and that is the 
‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general 
direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 
‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant 
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. (p. 12) 
Hegemony for Gramsci only covers what Williams (1977: 121–127) terms 
dominant culture and part of what he terms residual culture and selective tradition, 
but not what Williams terms emergent culture, by which he understands ‘new 
meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationships’ 
that are ‘substantially alternative or oppositional’ (Williams, 1977, 123; see 
also 2005: 37–42; 1981a: 204–205). 
Another concept Williams (1977) uses is ‘structures of feeling’, by which he refers 
to ‘meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt’, ‘structures of 
experience’, ‘affective elements of consciousness and relationships’ and ‘thought as 
felt and feeling as thought’ (p. 132). In Culture & Society, Williams (1958 
[1983]) uses the term structure (in the singular) of feeling multiple times without 
defining it. In The Long Revolution, he defines the structures of feeling as ‘the 
meanings and values which are lived in works and relationships’ (Williams, 1961 
[2011]: 337). Hegemony and structures of feeling are terms that Williams employs for 
mediations of and between society and the individual, and also between social 
structures and individual agency. However, just like hegemony, a structure (of 
feeling) cannot describe the process that connects individuals and society. A specific 
category is missing, namely the one of communication. 
Whereas cognition is always ongoing in the human brain, they are only possible 
through and at the same time constitute the foundation of communication. We 
experience the world both individually and socially. Social experience conditions 
individual experience and vice versa. Communication is the process that organises 
the relationship of individual and social experience and relates the individual to other 
individuals and thereby to groups, organisations, social systems, institutions, social 
spaces and society. Communication connects the individual to society. 
Information society theories tend to advance the ideology of the immaterial. This 
ideology fetishises the new that it presents as radical rupture from the old. Concepts 
such as the post-industrial society, network society, knowledge-based society and 
information society therefore often imply the end of capitalism. Along with these 
concepts, it is regularly assumed that with the rise of the Internet, labour and 
production have become weightless and immaterial. Notions such as immaterial 
labour, cloud computing and weightless economy imply that we live in an immaterial 
world of communication(s). 
Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism is a reminder that we need to look at the 
conditions of production of the Internet and digital media. In 2015, the Internet 
consumed 8 percent of the world’s global electricity production (De Decker, 2015). 
Given that green energy forms only account for a small share of worldwide energy 
generation, operating the Internet is environmentally unsustainable. 
According to estimations, around 50 million tonnes of e-waste are generated per 
year and predictions are that within 4 years, there will be a further growth by 33 
percent (Vidal, 2013; see also Maxwell and Miller, 2012). This amount of e-waste is 
around 7 kg per person in the world. Up to 45 percent of the total e-waste is treated 
informally and illegally (Rucevska et al., 2015: 4, 7). Large volumes of e-waste end 
up in developing countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Cote D’Ivoire, the Republic of the 
Congo, China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam, where they 
pollute the soil and poison e-waste workers who dismantle the technologies. 
Communicative materialism means critically questioning the social production of 
communication(s). Digital media are produced and used based on an international 
division of digital labour (IDDL; Fuchs, 2014, 2015). In it, we, for example, find slave 
workers who extract minerals under the threat of being killed and low-paid 
component assemblers working under harsh conditions at Foxconn in China. There 
are also highly paid and highly stressed software engineers at Google and other tech 
companies who suffer from leisure time poverty. Furthermore, we in the IDDL find 
low-paid Indian programmers and users who as digital workers produce value when 
using targeted-advertising-based platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Weibo and 
Twitter. There are also precarious freelancers working in the digital media industries, 
online crowd workers and so on. 
The IDDL involves both manual and mental labour. Williams (1983a) argues that 
definitions of the working class as either blue-collar wage earners or broader 
definitions that include also white-collar wage workers exclude ‘the whole diverse 
body of people who are not, in such terms [of earning a wage], “economically active”’ 
(p. 159). Feminist Marxism stresses, in this context, the importance of houseworkers 
in the reproduction of capitalism. Today, an entire shadow economy of ‘housewifised’ 
workers, who are unpaid or precarious, has emerged. The use of targeted-
advertising-based social media platforms is just one of the numerous examples of 
shadow labour (Lambert, 2015) and digital labour (Fuchs, 2014, 2015, 2017b) 
Donald Trump’s success in becoming the 45th US President displays the 
materiality of communication that Raymond Williams writes about. Trump shows the 
interwovenness of communication, politics, the economy and ideology. Trump 
cannot simply be explained as an economic, political or ideological phenomenon. His 
economy, politics and ideology are staged and communicated as a public spectacle 
that gives his supporters psychological opportunities for identification, which is an 
expression of anger and anxiety (Fuchs, 2017a). Trump shows that communication 
is indeed, as Raymond Williams argued, a basic foundational and material aspect of 
contemporary society. Trump is also a communicative phenomenon, a phenomenon 
of capitalist, authoritarian, ideological, neoliberal and nationalist communication. He 
is ‘a one-man megabrand’ (Klein, 2017: 10), an economic and entertainment 
spectacle that has turned into a political spectacle. 
For a critical theory of communication, ideology is an important category. The next 




Williams (2005: 245, 242) is sceptical of general theories of ideology because they 
ignore lived experience in class society. He criticises structuralism and structuralist 
theories of language and ideology for downplaying ‘the practical encounters of 
people in society’ (Williams, 1989a: 157) and saw Althusser’s concepts of ideology 
and ideological state apparatuses as theoretical decline and abstractions (p. 174). 
Williams did, however, dedicate Marxism and Literature’s fourth chapter to the 
concept of ideology (Williams, 1977, 55–71). He argues that there are three 
understandings of ideology in Marxist theory: (a) meanings and ideas; (b) a specific 
class or group’s system of beliefs; and (c) a system of false, illusory beliefs and false 
consciousness (p. 55). He shows that Marx and Engels gave a polemical meaning to 
the term, using it for thought that neglects or ignores ‘the material social process of 
which “consciousness” was always a part’ (p. 58). The danger would be to think of 
ideologies as separate from and reflexes of material reality (p. 59). Marx would have 
stressed that ideas are themselves material products (p. 60). Thinking and imagining 
will always be social processes associated with physical ways ‘in voices, in sounds 
made by instruments, in penned or printed writing, in arranged pigments on canvas 
or plaster, in worked marble or stone’ (p. 62). Labour and social relations necessarily 
require imagination and language (p. 61–62). 
The concept of ideology as false consciousness aims as in Lukács’ History and 
Class Consciousness at identifying ‘truth with the idea of the proletariat’ (Williams, 
1977: 68). Williams does not go into any details, but says he finds Lukács’ approach 
unconvincing (p. 68). If ideology were merely some abstract, imposed set of notions, 
if our social and political and cultural ideas and assumptions and habits were merely 
the result of specific manipulation, of a kind of overt training which might be simply 
ended or withdrawn, then society would be very much easier to move and to change 
than it in practice has ever been or is. (Williams, 2005: 37) 
Ideology is lived in educational institutions, the family and so on, where the 
dominant culture is learned and incorporated, but there is always the potential it can 
also be challenged by alternative and oppositional forms that constitute an emergent 
culture (Williams, 2005: 39–42). 
Williams (1977) points out the different uses of the term ideology in Marxism but 
does not give his own definition. Marxist understandings of ideology hover ‘between 
“a system of beliefs characteristic of a certain class” and “a system of illusory beliefs 
– false ideas or false consciousness” – which can be contrasted with true or scientific 
knowledge’ (p. 66). Williams (2005) is critical of two positions that characterise two 
opposite poles of Marxist concepts of ideology. He, on one hand, questioned left 
populism that considers ways of how ‘the people see it’ (p. 241) as automatically 
good, progressive and authentic. On the other hand, he disagrees with positions that 
show ‘contempt of people’ (p. 241) which assumes that ‘the people’ are ‘simply being 
betrayed or manipulated’, which ignores ‘the changes that were being lived into the 
fibres’ (p. 242). 
Williams did not, however, completely reject the notion of manipulation and 
ideology as false consciousness. Let us next look at a series of examples of how he 
applies the ideology concept in different contexts. He describes strategies of 
the Sun, Mail and Express as powerful ‘manipulative methods’ (Williams, 2003b: 
217) supported by press concentration. We can also find other instances, where he 
is closer to the positions of Lukács and the Frankfurt School than he admitted. 
For example, Williams (1983c: 239–256) gave a lecture about Robert Tressell’s 
1914 novel The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists. Tressell’s book is about the 
difficulties the worker Frank Owen encounters when trying to convince his fellow 
workers of socialism. They believe in the ideology of their masters. Williams 
comments that Owen thinks ‘the real enemy […] are the people who soak in the daily 
evidence of their condition and yet remain content; who displace their dissatisfaction 
onto other people’ (p. 252). They are ‘inside the condition of the class, outside its 
consciousness’ (p. 252), ‘vulnerable not only to propaganda and the self-
justifications of others who have an interest in perpetuating ignorance, but an 
ignorance that gets built in, inside people themselves; an ignorance that becomes 
their common sense’ (p. 256). The strength of Tressell’s book, however, is in the 
attitude it communicates: ‘You are a prisoner, and you’ll only get out of this prison if 
you’ll admit it’s a prison. And if you won’t call it a prison, I will, and I’ll go on calling it 
a prison, come what may’ (p. 256). Williams’ characterisation of internalised anti-
socialism as ‘soaking in’, ‘displacement’, ‘outside of working class consciousness’, 
‘propaganda’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘prison’ is not so far from the assumption that the 
workers in The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists have and live an ideological, false 
consciousness. 
Williams also sees advertising as an ideology in the negative sense of the term. 
There are many examples in his work, all still relevant. In his essay Advertising: the 
Magic System, Williams (2005) defines advertising as ‘a major form of modern social 
communication’ (p. 185) that is ‘an institutionalized system of commercial information 
and persuasion’ (p. 170). Advertising is a magical system, ‘a highly organized and 
professional system of magical inducements and satisfactions, functionally very 
similar to magical systems in simpler societies, but rather strangely coexistent with a 
highly developed scientific technology’ (p. 185). The alternative between capitalism 
and socialism includes a fundamental choice between ‘man as consumer and man 
as user’. Advertising is ‘a functional obscuring of this choice’ (p. 186) and obscures 
‘the real sources of general satisfaction’ (p. 189). It is ‘organized fantasy’ that 
presents corporations’ decisions as ‘your choice’ (p. 193), a ‘world of suggestion and 
magic’ (Williams, 1983b: 71). Advertising ‘permeates the whole communications 
system, […] its methods have been […] widely extended into public relations and 
politics’ (Williams, 1976: 163–164). Advertising is a ‘huge area of cultural production 
as commercial persuasion’ (Williams, 1981b: 13). Advertising is selling ‘both 
consumer goods and “a way of life”’ (Williams, 2003a: 36). ‘It is a way organizing and 
directing a consuming public, which is given real but only limited and marginal 
choices’ (Williams, 1968: 44). Williams (2003a: chapter 4) shows in an empirical 
analysis that advertising-based television tends to privilege commercial content over 
public-service programming, and that the news on such stations tends to take on the 
style, form and language of advertisements. 
For Williams, advertising tries to ‘persuade’, to ‘induce’, to ‘obscure’ and to create 
fantasies by appearing to operate as magic. Williams (1989b) uses the language of 
ideology critique, but in Advertising: The Magic System, he does not speak of 
advertising as commodity and consumption ideology. In another essay, he says 
advertising is part of ‘the false ideology of communications’ (p. 29). 
Although Williams in other places criticises ideology critique such as Lukács and 
the Frankfurt School, he uses the same vocabulary. He is certainly right that we 
cannot assume that ideology works automatically and is always accepted and 
reproduced. But, at the same time, ideology is not automatically resisted either. 
Where ideology works, it is not just communicated but also lived and experienced, 
and thereby internalised by consumers and citizens. There are many attempts to 
make ideologies work, but we only know in hindsight which ones do. In the case of 
advertising, commercial ideology works when consumers consciously or 
unconsciously have positive feelings and associations with specific ads that increase 
the likelihood that in particular situations they purchase and consume the advertised 
commodities. So critical studies of advertising must look at the whole cycle of the 
production, content, distribution and consumption of ads and commodities, including 
the ideological content, as well as the meanings and desires the consumers and 
advertisers associate with them. Scholars have acknowledged that Williams has 
anticipated the importance of the symbolic and lifestyle aspects of branding and 
advertising (Wharton, 2013). Williams (2005) argues that given that capitalism’s 
structure of feeling, meanings and values gives no answer to ‘problems of death, 
loneliness, frustration, the need for identity and respect’ (p. 190), magical systems 
create meanings and work as an ersatz culture. Other approaches have used the 
term ideology instead of magical systems: Williams’ approach is certainly compatible 
with thinking in the line of thought of the Frankfurt School. 
Williams saw mainstream communication studies as ideological, instrumental, 
administrative and uncritical. The focus on Lasswell’s formula ‘Who says what how 
to whom with what effect?’ leaves out the question ‘with what purpose?’ and 
excludes intention (Williams, 2005: 181). This general criticism of mainstream 
communication theory was a foundation for Williams’ critique of technological 
determinism: In Television, Williams (2003a) criticises the technological determinism 
of McLuhan and others as an ideology – ‘an ideological representation of technology 
as a cause’ (p. 131) that is ‘a self-acting force which creates new ways of life’ (p. 6). 
He opposes this view by a dialectic of intentions and the social order, on one hand, 
and technology, on the other (pp. 132–138). Williams (1983b: 128–152) challenges 
technological optimism as much as technological pessimism as a form of 
technological determinism that defends established institutions against change. 
When Williams (1983b) criticises Thatcherism and neoliberalism as ideologies in 
the early 1980s, he argues that ‘a new politics of strategic advantage’ (p. 244) that 
he termed ‘Plan X’ is a code for ‘a neoliberal hegemony’ (McGuigan, 2015: 27) and 
the ‘neoliberal structure of feeling’ (McGuigan, 2016: 23). The defining factor of Plan 
X is to protect capital and the political elite’s advantage, it does not care about 
broader effects on society, and therefore is ‘a willed and deliberate unknown’ 
(Williams, 1983b: 245). 
Although Williams does not define ideology, we can from his examples of tabloid 
news, anti-socialism, advertising, technological determinism and Thatcherism 
deduce a definition. Ideology is a particular form of instrumental communication. It is 
a communicative strategy that the ruling class uses in order to try to achieve a 
strategic advantage and convince and persuade others of a specific dominant 
interest by manipulation, displacement, ignorance, inducement, mystification, 
inducement, obscuration, the organisation of fantasies and desires. 
Williams’ discussions of ideology show that he was struggling with finding a 
definitive understanding of the term. He was critical of general concepts of ideology 
that make ideology synonymous with culture and of understanding ideology as 
manipulation and false consciousness. The solution to the problem of how to 
understand ideology is to assume that ideology is a communicative strategy that 
aims at legitimating dominative interests by specific communication strategies. 
Williams stresses that we in hindsight can understand which ideologies are 
successful because they have become actively lived by human subjects and 
associated experiences, feelings, desires, sentiments and subjectivities in everyday 
life. 
In the world of the Internet today, we find ideologies of the Internet and ideologies 
on the Internet. Ideologies of the Internet are a form of public communication that 
fetishises instrumental control of online communication. It is instrumental 
communication about instrumental communications, a meta-form of communication 
that justifies and defends the application of instrumental reason to the Internet. 
Neoliberal ideologies of the Internet, for example, present the online world as a 
frontier for investments that will create a better world. They leave out questions of 
inequality, digital labour, class and exploitation. Google describing itself in its ten 
core principles as showing that ‘democracy on the web works’ because ‘Google 
search works because it relies on the millions of individuals posting links’. 
Democracy is reduced to user-generated content production online and the notion of 
participatory online culture. Questions relating to the secrecy of Google’s search 
algorithm, its monopoly power in the search market, users and employees’ lack of 
control of its means and so on are not asked. Ideologies of the Internet in the context 
of the state justify state surveillance, censorship and control of the Internet and leave 
out questions of privacy and freedom of speech. Ideologies on the Internet are the 
expressions of fascism, racism, right-wing extremism, nationalism, classism, sexism, 
anti-Semitism and so on online. Right-wing ideology flourishing in many societies is 
also highly present online and on social media. Ideology on the Internet tends to 
make use of audio-visual means generated by users (such as memes, videos, 
images, animations and music) and tabloidisation (simplification, few words, 
emotionalisation, scandalisation, polarisation, banalisation, manipulation, fabrication, 
etc.). User-generated ideology is the phenomenon that ideology production is no 
longer confined to professional ideologues but is produced and reproduced by users 




Raymond Williams’ work contains key foundations for and elements of a materialist 
theory of communication. His approach can together with other social theories be 
used as a foundation for a critical theory of communication (Fuchs, 2016a). Williams’ 
communicative materialism allows us to theorise communication and aspects of the 
communication process, such as its role in society, its various types, the dialectic of 
communication and communications, ideology as peculiar form of communication, 
the role of communication(s) in capitalism and alternative, democratic 
communication(s). 
Stuart Hall, in his last interview, said that contemporary cultural studies often do 
not expand ‘a Marxist tradition of critical thinking – […] and that is a real weakness’ 
(Jhally, 2016: 338). He argues for a ‘return to what cultural studies should have been 
about and was during the early stages’ (p. 338). Williams’ materialist concept of 
culture is one way that can allow media and cultural studies to renew its engagement 
with Marx and Marxist theory. Williams engaged closely with Marx’s works and 
established his own humanist version of a Marxist theory of society and culture that 
gives attention to the production and reproduction of communication as one of the 
foundations of the social order. Williams argues that, for Marx, materialism means 
that humans produce and reproduce the social and thereby society. ‘By producing 
their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life’ (Marx, 
1988: 37). Williams argues that communications are such means of human 
subsistence. The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of 
activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of 
life on their part. (Marx, 1988: 37) 
Williams stresses that communication is the mode of production of the social and 
society, and the mode of social and societal life. 
Stuart Hall grounded his notion of communications in Marx’s theory. At the time 
when Hall wrote his famous Encoding/Decoding article in 1973, he also worked on a 
new reading of Marx’s (1857) Introduction to the Grundrisse. This interpretation of 
Marx was published as the first essay in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies’ Stencilled Occassional Papers-Series (Hall, 1973a). Hall stressed the 
importance of Marx’s dialectic of production, circulation and consumption. 
The Encoding/Decoding essay is an application of this dialectic to communications: 
‘Thus – to borrow Marx’s terms –circulation and reception are, indeed, “moments” of 
the production process in television’ (Hall 1973: 119). In Hall’s famous visualisation 
of the encoding/decoding process and its description, we cannot find human beings 
but rather technical infrastructures, structures of production, knowledge frameworks, 
meaning structures, discourses and programmes. Communications are for Hall 
(1973b) structures for the articulation, encoding and decoding of meanings and 
discourses. The encoding/decoding model later influenced the cultural circuit model 
(Johnson, 1986 [1987] Du Gay  et al., 1997), in which communication does not 
feature prominently as a concept. 
Whereas Hall provides a more structuralist model of communications grounded in 
Marx’s Introduction, Williams – based on Marx’s German Ideology – sees 
communication as human social agency, humans’ production of social relations, 
sociality and society. For Hall (1980), Williams represents cultural studies’ ‘culturalist’ 
tradition. To be more precise, one should say that Williams advanced a humanist, 
cultural-materialist and communicative-materialist version of Marxism, in which the 
communication concept played an important role. In his most detailed discussion of 
Williams’ works, Hall (2016, 25–53) argues that ‘human practice’ as ‘the material 
activity of human beings’ forms the core of Williams’ approach (p. 39). Williams’ 
humanist position sees language and communication as practices, whereas in 
structuralism, language and communications are discursive structures (p. 72). 
Today, in the age of digital capitalism, it is worth re-engaging with the Marxist 
foundations of cultural studies, including Williams’ writings, Hall’s explicitly Marxist 
works, Marx’s writings and the long and diverse traditions of Marxist theory. 
In communicative materialism, communication is a process of social production, 
through which humans produce and reproduce meanings, culture, social relations, 
sociality, social structures, social systems and society. Communication is the 
process of the constitution of social relations. It requires means of communication as 
means of production. Cultural and communicative materialism allows a dialectical 
and materialist understanding of digital media phenomena such as digital labour, 
ideologies on and of the Internet, the digital commons and so on. For Williams (1958 
[1983], 319–338), working-class culture is not a particular form or a type of content 
but a common and collective idea of culture. This involves access to education and 
culture for all. ‘The human fund is regarded in all respects common, and freedom of 
access to it as a right constituted by one’s humanity; yet such access, in whatever 
kind, is common or it is nothing’ (Williams, 1958[1983]: 326). Only a resource that is 
owned and used in common can benefit all. Williams’ approach speaks against 
digital capitalism and for the digital commons. 
The ‘sharing society’ has to ‘begin by really sharing what it has, or all its talk of 
sharing is false or at best marginal’ (Williams, 1983b: 101). Uber, Airbnb, 
crowdsourcing and crowdfunding are ideological forms of sharing that are not about 
sharing the means of communication as means of production and the benefits these 
means produce among all citizens and users. An alternative sharing society has to 
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1.Williams does not explain why he distinguishes communication from 
communications. Society is based on a dialectic of structures and agency. With the 
rising complexity of society, systems of communication have emerged (means of 
communication) that enable communication over spatio-temporal distances. There is 
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